

Mismanagement of Municipal Debt Puts a Hole in Everybody's Pocket



August 8, 2012

Bird's Eye View of Municipal Finance

Significant segment of fixed income market

50,000 issuers

Outstanding debt \$3 trillion

2 million individual bonds

Issuers rely on external advice for transactions

'Financial advisors' for bonds

'Swap advisors' for swaps

Industry regulated by the MSRB

Under Dodd-Frank advisors will be certified

Largest trade association is the GFOA

Recommends 'best practice'

Areas of Involvement

Intraday pricing of bond ETF's

Fair value of underlying portfolio must be reported every 15 seconds (SEC)

Calculation requires a live benchmark yield curve

Debt management advisor to issuers

Testified on municipal derivatives at SEC hearing

Expert witness on swapped variable-rate transaction

Member of the MSRB 'municipal advisor' certification task force

Topics

Municipal swaps

SEC testimony (July 2011)

LIBOR fixing

The allure of 5% bonds

The Bond Buyer, February 3, 2012

Understanding the municipal yield curve

Why it always slopes upwards

Journal of Fixed Income (Winter 2008)

After-tax valuation of municipal bonds

Incorporating the de minimis rule

Typical Use of Swaps: Synthetically 'Fix' Bond Coupon

Municipality issues variable rate bonds

Auction rate or VRDO*

Enters into 'plain vanilla' interest rate swap

Pay fixed, receive floating

Swap notional amortizes like bond principal

Potential problems:

Bonds cannot be economically refunded

Long fixed coupon munis are always callable

LIBOR rate received on swaps introduces basis risk

Poor correlation with bond's variable rate

Credit of liquidity provider, bond/swap insurer, etc.

***Auction Rate Securities** do not require liquidity provider, but issuer may be stuck with punitive rate if auction fails.

Variable Rate Demand Obligations – Remarketing agent sets rate so bonds will clear. If remarketing fails or bonds put back without replacement buyer, issuer draws on liquidity facility.

Swapped Variable Rate Bonds Feed Many Mouths

Mark-up of swap (*bank's raison d'être for the deal*)

Bank counterparty*

Conventional Fixed Rate Bond Issuance Expenses	Additional Expenses* for Synthetic Fixed
Underwriter	Swap Advisor
Bond Advisor	Swap Insurer
Bond Insurer	Remarketing Agent (ongoing)
Rating Agency	Liquidity Provider (ongoing)
Legal Counsel	

* *Supposedly incurred to 'save money'.*

But deals are likely to go bad and cost much more!

THE BOND BUYER

THE DAILY NEWSPAPER OF PUBLIC FINANCE

What Makes Muni Swaps So Special? Nothing, Actually

Friday, February 4, 2011

By Andrew Kalotay



... But there is a stark difference in practice: municipalities pay significantly more than other market participants for essentially the same product.

Given the regular swap market," it may be worthwhile to identify what distinguishes it from the regular swap market.

In substance, these markets are basically the same. But there is a stark difference in practice: municipalities pay significantly more than other market participants for essentially the same

... The swap dealer obviously will charge what the market will bear. Unfortunately, the municipality's grossly overcompensated hired guns — swap advisers, lawyers and such — provide inadequate protection and are conflicted by self-interest.

municipal swaps to "transaction fee"

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Bid-Ask Spreads for LIBOR Swaps Are Extremely Tight*

Term	2-Year	5-Year	10-Year	30-Year
Bid Rate (%)	0.659	1.830	3.068	3.895
Ask Rate (%)	0.665	1.833	3.070	3.898
Difference (%)	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.003

*Source: Bloomberg, July 12, 2011 4pm (YCRV <GO> S23)

Reported Fair Value of Swap For Accounting Purposes Is 'Fair'

Denver Public School District No. 1
Value of \$750 million 4.859% LIBOR swap as of June 30, 2010

Reported by banks*	\$142,866,925
Kalotay Fair Value	\$144,174,835
Difference	\$1,307,910
Difference as percent of notional amount	0.17%

**Source: Denver School District No.1 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 2010*

But Transacted Rate In 2008 Was Far From 'Fair'

Denver Public School District No. 1
Value of \$750 million 4.859% LIBOR swap as of April 22, 2008

Perceived Value (to DPS)	0
Kalotay Fair Value	\$13,583,213*
Mark-up as percent of notional amount	1.81%

**Adjusted for \$550,000 paid by banks upfront to cover fees to swap advisor (\$425,000), swap counsel (\$100,000), and swap pricing agent (\$25,000). Source: Swap confirmation documents*

Estimated fair coupon was 4.73%, nearly 13 basis points lower than that of actual swap

Hidden Tax of Municipal Swaps On a National Scale

Estimated notional amount of swap transactions in
last 5 years: \$1 trillion

According to MSRB report of April 2009, annual
municipal derivatives volume grew to \$300 billion

Mark-up to fair value: 2% of notional amount

Cost to taxpayers: \$20 billion

2% of \$1 trillion

What to Do? The Brandeis Answer

“Sunlight is the best of disinfectants; electric light is the best policeman”


-- *Other People's Money*, 1913

Regulators emphasize disclosure, but don't appreciate the need for rigorous valuation

Implications of the LIBOR Fixing Scandal

Typical synthetic fixed rate transaction:

Pay 'SIFMA' on bonds, receive percent of
'LIBOR' on swap



Artificially low LIBOR short-changes issuers

But damage is modest

AUGUST 2, 2012



Morning Bell

House panel approves muni adviser bill, but changes are on tap

A House Financial Services subcommittee approved legislation that would define municipal advisers. The measure doesn't require muni advisers to meet a fiduciary-duty standard of care, but a substitute amendment will, according to Rep. Robert Dold, R-Ill. The full committee will vote on the substitute amendment soon. Dold's office said the amendment addresses industry concerns. Kenneth Bentsen Jr., executive vice president of public policy and advocacy at SIFMA, said the group is encouraged because "there was virtually unanimous recognition that the SEC's December 2010 proposed rule on municipal advisers goes far beyond congressional intent

THE BOND BUYER

THE DAILY NEWSPAPER OF PUBLIC FINANCE

The Allure of 5% Bonds: Coupon Levitation Creates Magical Savings

Friday, January 27, 2012

By Andrew Kalotay

During the past few years, there has been a significant shift in the market for municipal bonds of various maturities. These bonds are now being sold at a premium, and many of these bonds were once considered "junk."

... Fortunately, nobody gets fired in municipal finance for "saving money".

municipal bonds of various maturities, interest rates, and longer-term maturities.

This trend is attributed to institutional investors' preference for premium bonds over par bonds. Three reasons are often cited. First, the current yield of 5% bonds is higher. Second, if rates rise, premium bonds are less likely to fall below the de minimis discount level, where there is additional downward price pressure.

Third, assuming they are eligible, 5% bonds are more likely to be advance-refunded and thus rendered triple-A, with a commensurate price appreciation. Such bonds are particularly desirable because of the scarcity of triple-As following the decline of bond insurance.

Investor Appeal of 5% Callable Bonds

Less likely to fall below the de minimis level if rates rise

Where gain to buyer would be taxed as ordinary income

Very likely to be advance refunded; virtually certain to be called in Year 10

Advance refunding entails cash matching bond payments to call date with Treasuries

Bond becomes AAA

Issuer Appeal of 5% Callable Bonds: A Case Study

Alternatives to raising \$100 MM by selling fairly priced 30-year bonds:

\$100 MM 4% bonds sold at 100
4.00% YTM, 4.00% YTC

OR

\$87 MM 5% bonds sold at 115
4.12% YTM, 3.23% YTC

Which alternative to choose?

The Answer Is Sure to Surprise You!

Sell 5% bonds and *immediately* refund them with 4% bonds

Assumes no 'negative arbitrage' and disregards transaction costs

The proof:

PV of 5% bonds over 30 years: 102.1MM

Cost of defeasance to call date: 100.0MM

Net savings: \$2.1MM

What's Wrong with Issuing 5% Callable Bonds?

Refunding is virtually guaranteed

Even if rates increase; call option is deep in the money

Consequences are undesirable

Additional issuance expense for municipality

Doubling the volume of tax-exempt debt that supports an eligible project

Underlying Problems of Municipal Finance

Advisors conflicted and underqualified

Swap advisors get paid only if transaction consummated

Bond advisors reluctant to confront banks

Guidance from GFOA inadequate

“Best practice” makes no mention of option value

Refunding threshold based on NPV savings

Winning competitive bid determined by TIC

Management not accountable

Not subject to Sarbanes-Oxley

Exempt from corporate disclosure requirements

In a state of denial

Subtleties of Municipal Yield Curves Provided Daily by MMA and MMD

Indicated yields are for bonds assumed to be
callable at par after 10 years


Hence the long end must slope upwards

Assumed coupon is 5% for every maturity

High-grade bonds priced well above par


Yields are *to call* (rather than YTM)

5% NC-10 Curve (MMA 7/23/12)



Implied Par Optionless Curves

Essential for Proper Valuation



The New York Times

July 30, 2012

Muni Rates Examined for Signs of Rigging

By NATHANIEL POPPER

Yet another key benchmark in the financial industry is under scrutiny.

Attention has swung to a set of benchmark interest rates that help determine how much cities and states pay to borrow money in the bond market. The scrutiny of the Municipal Market Data, or M.M.D. index, comes on the heels of revelations that a broader financial industry benchmark, the London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor, was manipulated by banks before and after the financial crisis. Libor is used to help determine the costs of products like mortgages and credit cards.

Tax Treatment of Tax-exempt Bonds Held to Maturity – Simple Version


Purchase Price	Treatment	Tax Rate
At a premium	Premium amortized to zero	N/A
At par	No gain or loss	N/A
At de minimis* discount	Taxed as capital gain	15%
At discount greater than de minimis	Taxed as ordinary income	35%

**0.25 x number of years remaining to maturity (e.g. 2.50 for 10-year bond)*

All interest is tax-free

After-Tax Value Based on Holding to Maturity Is Discontinuous

2% 10-Year Bond



Solution to the Dilemma: After-tax Trading Opportunities

On an after-tax basis selling at a loss and reinvesting is preferable to doing nothing

And selling at a gain is worse

Example: Selling bond at 80 (purchased at par) results in an immediate tax break of 3 points $(100 - 20) \times 0.15$.

Greater interest rate volatility implies more opportunities for after-tax trading

Our Approach to After-tax Valuation

True OAS-based lattice implementation

Incorporates tax treatment

Including de minimis rule

Bond sold and proceeds reinvested if price declines


No action taken if price increases

Produces sensible and realistic results

No falling off the cliff

After-tax Lattice Model Smooths Out De Minimis Effect

2% 10-Year Bond



Innovations/Analytics for Municipal Bonds

“Introducing TIC+: Rethinking TIC Calculation”

– *IPREO Newsletter*, June 2012

“Patent Sought for Tax Credit Bond Idea”

– *Bond Buyer*, July 9, 2012

(see www.kalotay.com/research)

Bond analytics demos (www.kalotay.com bottom right)

Values 6,000 callable bonds in 1.5 seconds

DebtPays software

Comes with 1.2 million bonds from Mergent

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