

Fund (mis)classification

Evidence based on Style Analysis V2.0

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"The best way to win a contest for the largest tomato...
... is to paint a cantaloupe red...
... and hope the judges don't notice."



diBartolomeo and Witkowski, Financial Analyst Journal, 1997.



Motivation

- One must be able to evaluate active managers if one is to hire them.
 - Finding the correct peer group for an investment strategy is the most important step in doing this.
 - If a fund is not being compared to the correct peer group the active returns and historic alpha & IR are misleading.
 - If a fund is mis-classified it may not be as diversifying in the context of other holdings as the investor may think.
- Checking fund classification can be a very simple & practical due diligence measure / selection criterion.
 - if a fund is misclassified, what else could be wrong with its management?
 - If a fund is misclassified and there's a comparable fund that is classified correctly why not choose the fund with the correct label?

V1.0 Summary

- diBartolomeo & Witkowski, Mutual Fund Misclassification: Evidence Base on Style Analysis published in the AIMR journal in 1997.
 - Covered 748 funds
 - 6 peer groups: aggressive growth; growth; growth-income; income; international, and; small cap.
 - 298 or 40% of all funds were found to have a their greatest style analysis weight in a peer group other than their classification.
 - About 60% wound up being less risky than they said they were
 - About 40% wound up being more risky than they said they were

V 1.0 Summary ... Cont'd

- When fund issuers were observed in aggregate, however there was evidence of systematic misclassification:
 - "...although misclassification appears to take place in both directions (into more and less aggressive categories), among seriously misclassified funds, the ratio of funds misclassified was nearly 2/1 The result allows us to reject the null hypothesis that an equal number of funds is misclassified upward and downward.
 - "...probit analysis reveals that misclassification is not random, but related to fund size and assets under management to a statistically significant degree."

What is Style Analysis?

- Developed by Bill Sharpe in 1984, style analysis is best described as an OLS regression where the all independent variables B_n are constrained:
 - $Y = B_n X + \varepsilon$
 - $0 < B_n < 1$
 - $\sum B_n = 1$
- Since style weights add up to one they can be thought of as percentage weights.
- The greatest style weight will be assigned to the independent variable that explains most of the behavior of the dependent variable.
- In the specific case of fund classification, the fund returns are the dependent variable and peer group index returns are the independent variables

What's Unique about Northfield's Style Analysis


- diBartolomeo & Lobosco. 1997. "Approximating the Confidence Intervals for Sharpe Style Weights". Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 53, no. 4 (July/August): 80-85
- We've implemented this methodology & only apply results that are approximately significant at the 5% level.

What's different in V2.0?

- Now using the TR Lipper fund DB. Over 20,000 US funds equity and fixed income in dataset.
- 169 initial fund classifications.
- Each fund is also assigned to one of 11 “Broad Allocations” and 4 “Asset Classes”.
- Using Style Analysis we can see frequency of “misclassification” at 3 levels of granularity.
- We reclassify funds and recalculate peer group indices iteratively, until classifications converge.
- We apply the CUSUM method to determine the relevant lookback period.
- We calculate Precision Weighted Excess Returns (PWER) for each fund using Bayes Law with the peer group return as the prior – these can be useful in a manager selection process.

What is CUSUM? Magellan case study...

Cumulative IR – Magellan vs. S&P



Magellan Case Study – cont'd...

- What happened in the mid 80's? Nascent technology boom... Peter Lynch, practicing what he preached ("buy what you know") began withdrawing from the management of Magellan.
- When considering Magellan now... which one do we want to analyze? The whole history? The glory years? The current reality?
- Using the CUSUM method to find the most recent major inflection point in the historic plot of cumulative IRs is a useful way to set a relevant look-back period for peer group classification and manager selection purposes.

CUSUM details...

- Calculate active returns to peer group
- Calculate mean and standard deviation (we use a rolling window of 24 months by default)
- Use Mean and Standard Deviation to get the Information Ratio
- Calculate the cumulative sum of the information ratio, i.e. $CUSUM_n = CUSUM_{n-1} + IR_n$
- Calculate critical date point
 - Create series: $ABS(ER_n - ER_{n-1}) * SQRT(N - n)$
 - ER = excess return
 - N = total number of periods
 - n = current period
 - Find maximum in above series – the corresponding date is the pivot – bias towards the start of the series. Magellan CD = 09/83

Method - P1 – winnowing classifications

- 169 classifications are too many to provide enough depth, even with 20,000 funds, to build peer group indices.
- So we rank each classification according to 2 parameters:
 - (1) The number of funds in the classification
 - (2) The average correlation in returns between funds
- and build a third ranking (3) composed of 40%(1) + 60%(2)
- we add the first two sectors by ranking (3) from each broad allocation
- then add all classifications in the “sector equity” & “diversified equity” broad allocation – these are all very deep and need to be represented
- add the next 40 sectors by ranking (3)
- Distribute the displaced funds amongst the remaining 69 sectors by finding the highest correlation to the corresponding equally weighted sector index return.

Method - P2 – find grossly misclassified funds

- In addition to belonging to one of 169 fund sectors, each fund belongs to one of 11 “broad allocations” and one of 4 “asset classes”.
- We set up a style analysis where fund returns are the dependent variable and the asset class indices are the independent variables
- If the primary style analysis weight is a different asset class than the one the fund is assigned to & it is significant ($TVal \geq 2.0$) we consider the fund to be “grossly misclassified”.
- Transition matrix - 309 in the lower triangular – 107 in the upper - 416 total...

| | Money Market | Fixed Income | Mixed Assets | Equity | Total |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------|-------|
| Money Market | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fixed Income | 5 | | 8 | 10 | 23 |
| Mixed Assets | | 117 | | 89 | 206 |
| Equity | 0 | 43 | 144 | | 187 |
| | | | | | 416 |

Method – P2 – Broad Allocation Level

- After removing the “Asset Class” level mis-classifications from the data set, we do the same process for the “Broad Allocation” level. This time we have 350 out of 395 in the upper triangular – the vast majority of which are Mixed Asset transitions to riskier “broad allocations”.

| | MMM | MM | SIC | SIM | GMFI | MA | USTG | WFI | GDFI | AF | USDE | WE | SE | TOTAL |
|--------------------------------|-----|----|-----|-----|------|----|------|-----|------|----|------|-----|----|-------|
| Municipal Money Market | x | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Money Market | | x | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Short/Intermediate Corporate | | | x | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Short/Intermediate Municipal | | | | x | 11 | | | | | | | | | 11 |
| General Municipal Fixed Income | | | | 25 | x | | | | | | | | | 25 |
| Mixed Assets | | | | 18 | | x | | 20 | | | 10 | 304 | 5 | 357 |
| US Treasury & Government | | | | | | | x | | | | | | | 0 |
| World Fixed Income | | | | | | | | x | | | | | | 0 |
| General Domestic Fixed Income | | | | | | | | | x | | | | | 0 |
| Alternative Funds | | | | | | | | | | x | | | | 0 |
| US Diversified Equity | | | | | | | | | | | x | | | 0 |
| World Equity | | | | | | | | | | | | x | | 0 |
| Sector Equity | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | x | 2 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 395 |

Method – P3 – Sector Level...

- There's too many sectors, even after the winnowing process, 63, to use all of them as independent variables – so we limit the independent variables to the ones that belong to the same “broad allocation” as the dependent variable fund.
- In some cases there may not be enough history – especially after applying the CUSUM critical date, to allow enough degrees of freedom to run the style analysis (any regression needs more observation than independent variables)
- The resultant table is too big to print here... but out of 23,853 funds that met the screening criteria, 6,796 funds were reclassified by the process – or about 28%. Of those, 3,577 transitioned to less risky sectors and 3219 transitioned to more risky sectors.
- But what happens if we break this result down further and look at individual “Broad Allocations”

Method P4 – Sector level Cont'd

- What happens when we break it down further & look at just the funds in the Equity broad allocations?
 - 224 out of 1369 or 16% of funds changed classification in the “Sector Equity” broad allocation.
 - 3094 out of 6606 or 46% of funds changed classification within the “Diversified Equity” broad allocation
 - There were 6796 transitions in the entire dataset – nearly half of them took place within the “Diversified Equity” slice of data.
 - Diversified Equity is actually the closest dataset for comparison to V1.0 of this study where there were 6 peer groups based on growth/value style criteria – this broad allocation contains 18 peer groups also based on growth/value criteria, just breaking things out further by capitalization
 - V1.0 classifications: agg growth, growth, growth-income, income, international & small cap.
 - V2.0 classifications: large cap growth, large cap core, large cap value, mid cap growth, mid cap core, mid cap value, etc..

Method P4 – Sector level Cont'd (2)

- In “Diversified Equity” we find a comparable level of misclassification to the V1.0 of this study, done 18 years ago. It’s apples & oranges since the classification schemes are different, or maybe we should call it “apples and pears” as the classification criteria are similar, even though the current study is 3 times more granular.
 - I wouldn’t give the 6% increase much thought – it could just be down to the increased granularity of the peer group buckets.
 - It could also be down to the increased coverage of smaller funds with relatively low AUM

Method P4 – Sector level Cont'd (3)

- How about the other sectors, broken down by broad allocation?

| Broad Allocation | % change |
|--------------------------------|------------|
| Short/Intermediate Corporate | 10.3883495 |
| World Fixed Income | 13.277512 |
| Short/Intermediate Municipal | 13.559322 |
| General Domestic Fixed Income | 13.6784741 |
| US Treasury & Government | 16.3461538 |
| Sector Equity | 16.3623083 |
| Alternative Funds | 21.0629921 |
| Mixed Assets | 23.4936429 |
| World Equity | 25.1047194 |
| Municipal Money Market | 27.2959184 |
| General Municipal Fixed Income | 30.8453922 |
| Money Market | 34.1237113 |
| US Diversified Equity | 46.8362095 |

- In general, less risky classifications are at the top of the table with some notable exceptions all the way at the bottom of the table
 - Municipal Money Market
 - Money Market
 - General Municipal Fixed Income
- Here, the intuition is that the cross sectional dispersion within the peer group is so tight & the correlation between style analysis independent variables is so great that the process breaks down.

Conclusions

- Anecdotally – it seems things haven't changed much in the 18 years since V1.0 of this study was published.
 - The classification scheme is different here, but it's reasonable to assume that this doesn't really matter:
 - the classification criteria are similar...
 - if the motivation exists to misclassify people would continue to misclassify regardless of the label on the bucket.
- The overwhelming majority of misclassification at the “broad allocation” level was in the “mixed assets” category. This makes total sense as that category purposefully includes anything & is therefore pretty useless as a descriptor of a strategy.
- The validity of this approach for Money Markets & low risk fixed income strategies is questionable & needs to be verified.

Possible further directions

- Try this approach on an international dataset – Is fund misclassification as prevalent in Europe as it is in the USA? Fund misclassification was a big deal in the USA during the late 90s. It seems not much has changed since then. How about Europe & other regions?
- Apply fund issuer data & probit analysis as discussed in diBartolomeo & Witkowski to determine whether fund size & AUM
- Is the split between reclassification to more and less aggressive categories really equal? Use fund size & AUM data to weigh the split.
- Rank fund issuers according to % of funds under management that are misclassified – a sort of due-diligence or “trustworthy” index on issuer policy...